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1.  Aims of the Study 
In July 1997, the economies of East Asia became embroiled in one of the worst 
financial crises of the postwar period.  Yet, prior to the crisis, these economies were seen 
as models of economic growth experiencing sustained growth rates that exceeded those 
earlier thought unattainable.  Table 1 describes the situation for ASEAN4 and Korea 
before and after 1997.  The high growth from 1986-96 was suddenly followed by a 
collapse of the real economy, with negative growth in 1998.  In 1997, the exchange rates 
depreciated by double digits and, for some countries, the depreciation continued into 
1998.  
 
Table 1:  The Asian Crisis 1997-98 




 1986-96  1998:1-1998:6  1997  1998:1-1998:6 
Indonesia 7.4  -12.0 -52.0 -50.0 
Korea 8.6  -5.0  -43.0 6.0 
Malaysia 7.8  -5.0 -33.0 -1.0 
Philippines 3.7  -12.5
(a) -29.0 -5.0 
Thailand 9.1  -8.0 -44.0 16.0 
Source: IMF, Oct. 1998, tables 3.11, 3.12. (a) 1997:4-1998:2 
 
What went wrong?  What caused the financial crisis?  With hindsight, there is 
now a consensus as to what went wrong with the Asian countries.  Dean (2003)
1 briefly 
describes the consensus as follows.  The Asian growth was generated by high investment 
and saving.  The difference was financed by capital inflows, made possible when the 
economies were liberalized in the early 1990s.  Since these economies generally had 
                                                 
1  Dean (2001) contains the basic references on this subject, and the reader is referred to his article for the extensive 
bibliography. Flouzat (1999) and recent International Monetary Fund WEO reports describe the consensus view 
country by country.   4
fixed exchange rates, the capital inflows led to increases in the money supply.  There was 
inflation of asset prices, speculative bubbles, but not inflation of prices of goods and 
services.  The investment was poorly intermediated and misallocated.  
The capital inflows produced a high ratio of external debt and debt service 
obligations relative to export earnings.  With the bursting of the speculative bubble in 
asset prices, the former capital inflows turned to outflows.  The countries faced a 
dilemma.  If interest rates were raised to stem the outflow, the debt service burden to 
domestic borrowers would be raised.  If the interest rates were not raised, devaluation 
would have to occur; and the debt service burden on the foreign currency denominated 
debt would rise.  The net result was a financial collapse and exchange rate depreciation. 
But why did the market not anticipate the crises?
2  Could it be that the market and 
credit rating agencies failed to anticipate the crisis because there were no useful warning 
signals?  More importantly could it be that the range of qualitative and quantitative 
indicators normally monitored (for example, per capita income, growth rates, inflation 
rates, ratios of foreign debt to exports, history of defaults, level of economic 
development, government budget deficits, ratio of current account deficits to GDP) were 
not helpful because these measures were assessed in an ad hoc manner? 
We contend that it would be more useful to derive warning signals based on 
concepts derived from a coherent theoretical framework which can predict the crisis.  
Hence our aim is to present a coherent theory which may be used generate operational 
warning signals.  To this end, we review the Asian financial crisis from two related 
perspectives - whether the crisis was precipitated by a failure of the real exchange rate to 
be aligned with its fundamental determinants and/or whether the crisis was precipitated 
by a divergence of the foreign debt from its optimal path.  The first perspective is based 
on a coherent theory of the equilibrium real exchange rate which shows how 
“misalignments” lead to currency crises.  The second perspective is based on a model of 
optimal foreign debt ratio which showed why “divergences” lead to debt crises.  The 
important point here is that these models suggest important variables which may serve as 
warning signals to predict crises. 
                                                 
2  Available measures of expectations by market participants display a poor record in anticipating crises.  The 
secondary market yield spreads on US dollar denominated Eurobonds did not vary much before the Asian crisis, see 
IMF, WEO Dec. 1997, figure 14;  International Capital Markets, September 1999: 107-12. See also Berg and Pattillo.   5
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 of the paper we discuss some 
traditional warning signals.  Section 3 provides an overview of the Natural Real 
Exchange Rate (NATREX) approach to the determination of the equilibrium real 
exchange rate and the measure of misalignment that may serve as a warning signal for 
currency crises.  This section also describes the stochastic optimal control/dynamic 
programming (SOC/DP) approach to derive the optimal foreign debt ratio and shows how 
the deviation of the actual debt from this benchmark measure of performance may serve 
as a sufficient condition for a debt crisis.  In section 4 we explore the explanatory value 
of our theoretically-based warning signals all utilizing only available information to 
explain and predict the Asian crises.  Concluding remarks are contained in the final 
section 5. 
 
2.  Traditional Warning Signals 
This paper is concerned with two types of crises.  The first is a currency crisis, 
which results from an “overvalued” exchange rate, and the second is a debt crisis, which 
occurs when the country cannot service its foreign debt.  In both cases, the likely outcome 
is a dramatic currency devaluation or depreciation.  
A common view associated with currency crises is that they result from “unstable 
macroeconomic policies”.  Consequently the early warning measures are the state of key 
macroeconomic variables and the response to a currency crisis is to implement restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies.
3  Section 2.1 below explains why the crises in Asia could 
not be explained by “unstable macroeconomic policies”. Debt crises are associated with 
“unsustainable” external debt and section 2.2 reviews a few traditional measures of 
“unsustainability”.  
Warning Signals have two components. (a) What variables are considered? (b) 
What periods are compared? In this section, we focus primarily upon International 
Monetary Fund WEO reports that organized the data in forms (a) and (b) above: variables 
and comparison periods. For example, table 2 is based upon the IMF's presentation. We 
show the limitations of the standard approaches. 
                                                 
3  Some economists have argued that the way to avoid currency crises is to adopt a currency board or to replace the 
domestic currency with a foreign currency.   6
 
2.1.  Was there Macroeconomic Instability? 
It is now a well-documented that the Asian crises were not preceded by increases 
in “macroeconomic instability”.  Table 2 compares some macroeconomic indicators for 
the pre-crisis period 1986-96 with the earlier tranquil period 1975-85.  Inflation declined, 
and there were no significant increases in fiscal deficits or current account deficits.  By 
the usual standards of macroeconomic performance the Asian economies were doing very 
well.  In fact, prior to the crises, according to the International Monetary Fund (October 
1998, ch.III, pp.82ff), the successful economic performance of these East Asian countries 
can be attributable to their emphasis on stability oriented macroeconomic policies such as 
maintaining low rates of inflation, avoiding overvalued exchange rates, and sustaining 
high rates of physical and human capital accumulation and export oriented production.  
This evidence leads one to reject an assertion that the crises were produced by monetary 
and fiscal mismanagement. 
 
Table 2  Macroeconomic Variables 1975-85 and 1986-96 






 1975-85  1986-96  1975-85  1986-96  1975-85  1986-96 
Hong  
Kong 
8.2 8.0 1.1  2.1  3.0  5.6 
Indonesia 13.4  8.2 0.3  -0.5 -2.0  -2.8 
Korea 13.5  5.7  -2.2  -0.1  -3.7  0.9 
Malaysia 4.8  2.6  -5.3 -2.4 -3.2  -2.6 
Philippines 15.6 8.9  -2.0  -2.3  -5.1  -2.6 
Singapore 3.4 1.9 1.9  9.1  -7.2  9.5 
Taiwan 6.3  3  0.3  -0.5  4.3 7.8 
Thailand 7.2  4.5  -3.7 2.1 -5.5 -4.9 
Source: International Monetary Fund, October 1998, table 3.11 
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However, the currency did collapse and that leads one to question the usefulness 
of the above macroeconomic variables as warning signals of vulnerability.  In section 3, 
we suggest that it may be more useful to look at the behavior of the fundamental 
determinants of the real exchange rate to predict the probability of a currency crisis.  Our 
warning signals are based on a theoretically justifiable concept and measure of exchange 
rate misalignment. 
 
2.2.  Was the Foreign Debt Sustainable? 
Since the crises could not be attributed to “macroeconomic instability”, the focus 
turned to the role of the external debt
4 and to the weaknesses in the financial structure as 
explanations of the crises.  For the Asian economies, the banking system was the means 
by which foreign lending was intermediated through the corporate sector.  Equity markets 
played a limited role, and fixed income money and bond markets were less developed and 
liquid.  Table 3 describes the net private capital flows to Asia. 
 
Table 3  Net private capital flows to Asia 
$billion 1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  1997  1998 
Total  investment  19.6 34.1 17.9 57.3 66.4 95.1 100.5  3.2  -55.1 
Net  foreign  direct    9.3  14.4 14.8 33.0 45.3 49.8 55.1  62.6 50.0 
Net portfolio; 
Bond and equity 
-2.7  1.4 7.8 21.0  9.4 10.9  12.6  0.9 -15.4 
Bank 
loans,Investments 
13.0 18.4 -4.7 3.3  11.7 34.4 32.8  -60.3  -89.7 
Source: IMF, International Capital Markets, September 1999, table 3.1 
 
Table 3 shows the volatility in total capital flows.  Net foreign direct investment 
was the main component of the capital flows, 55% in 1996, and was relatively steady.  
The highly volatile element was the category of bank loans, which was about 33% in 
1996.  It switched from an inflow of $32.8 billion in 1996 to an outflow of $89.7 billion 
in 1998.  What caused the turnaround?  Clearly the outflow reflected a reaction to a 
                                                 
4  Both domestic and foreign investors held domestic debt.  Since part of the domestic debt was sometimes 
denominated in foreign currency or linked to the exchange rate, the distinction between domestic and foreign debt 
becomes blurred (see, Berg and Pattillo).     8
perceived weakness in the nature of the foreign debt.  Can we identify some features 
which may be used as indicators of financial stress? 
Consider first, an assessment of financial vulnerability from a perspective on the 
composition of debt.  The Fund considers countries with high levels of short term debt, 
variable interest rate debt and foreign currency denominated debt as being particularly 
vulnerable to internal and external shocks and thus as susceptible to financial crises.
5  
Was the Fund’s view correct?  Arteta (2003) investigated two questions.  First, does high 
dollarization of deposits and credits increase the likelihood of banking crises and 
currency crashes and second does the dollarization make these crises and crashes more 
costly?  He used a comprehensive dataset on deposit and credit dollarization for a large 
number of developing and transition economies and based on extensive econometric 
estimation finds little evidence of any particular link between high bank dollarization and 
the likelihood of banking crises or currency crashes.  
Next consider a macroeconomic aggregate approach based on a widely used 
measure of “solvency” or “sustainability” to assess the excessiveness of foreign debt.
6  
The measure of solvency is the net resource transfer (that is the trade surplus) that an 
indebted country must have to keep the ratio of external liabilities to GDP a constant.  
The argument is that the greater is the long term resource transfer, the greater is the 
probability of a debt crisis.  More specifically, the “sustainability” argument asks what 
will be the value of the steady state debt/GDP (in this paper denoted as h*) if current 
policy as measured by the current account deficit/GDP were to continue at the current 
growth rate?  The standard argument is that the greater is the equilibrium value of the 
debt h* based upon current policy, the greater is the probability of a crisis. 
To empirically apply this concept, the standard approach is to calculate h* as the 
ratio of current account deficit/GDP divided by the growth rate of GDP.  This is because 
in the steady state, when the ratio of debt/GDP has stabilized, the ratio of the current 
account deficit to the debt is equal to the growth rate.  Hence h* is as defined below.  
Table 4 presents the average value of h* over two sample periods, the pre-crisis period 
                                                 
5  See IMF, WEO, May 1998: p.85.  
6  See IMF, WEO, May 1998: 86-87; October 2003, ch. III   9
1986-96 and the corresponding 1975-85 tranquil period, for the Asian countries that 
experienced crises.  
 
Table 4:  Measure of “Sustainability” 
Country  h* = (Current Account deficit/GDP)/growth rate 
 1975-85  1986-96 
Hong Kong  -0.37  -0.89 
Indonesia 0.35  0.38 
Korea 0.49  -0.10 
Malaysia 0.51  0.33 
Philippines 1.76  0.68 
Singapore 1.0  -1.13 
Taiwan -0.52  -1.01 
Thailand 0.83  0.54 
Positive values of h* are debtor positions. 
 
As shown in Table 4, for Indonesia, there was no significant change in the 
“sustainable debt” measure; for Korea, the pre-crisis policies would have led to a creditor 
rather than to a debtor situation.  Similarly, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand would 
have become less of a debtor.  In other words, the current account deficit/GDP ratios in 
the pre-crisis period, were the same or less than what they were a decade earlier for the 
ASEAN4 and Korea.  In other words, these measures of sustainability would have failed 
to signal problems ahead for the Asian countries affected by the crisis. 
The failure of the above “sustainability” approach arises because, as explained in 
Stein and Paladino (2001), the growth rate is simply related to the current account 
without taking into account the purpose of the foreign borrowings.  If the current account 
deficit finances productive investment, then present current account deficits will generate 
future growth.  The latter can make the economy more competitive and increase future 
trade balances.  Moreover, another point to note here is that the actual debt to GDP ratio 
by itself is also not a relevant variable in predicting a debt crisis.  For example, the ratio   10
of debt service payments/exports for the Asian countries did not rise in the years before 
the crisis, as seen in table 5 below
7. 
 
Table 5:  Debt Service/Export Ratios (%) 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Asian  countries    20.9 17.7 17.3 18.1 17.8 16.0 15.7 16.1 
Developing  countries  24.5 21.3 22.7 23.8 23.8 23.1 22.0 23.1 
 
2.3 Summary of Market Anticipations. 
The International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets (September 1999, 
chapter V and annex V) contains a comprehensive analysis of market anticipations prior 
to the Asian crises. We draw upon and paraphrase the analysis contained there to evaluate 
the "early warning signals" used. 
Global securities markets became important sources of funding for many 
emerging market countries in the period of the 1990s. The portfolio preferences of the 
major institutional investors became key determinants and conditions of capital flows. 
Credit rating agencies had great influence upon the effective cost of capital charged by 
international lenders to the borrowers in the emerging market countries. In many cases, 
intuitional investors are constrained to hold securities that have been classified by rating 
agencies as investment grade. Therefore, the cost of capital is effectively reflected in the 
ratings of the agencies and/or the bond spread. These two variables should reflect the 
market anticipation of crises, whereby the debtor may experience difficulties in servicing 
the debt. 
Although the rating agencies stress that they do not use a specific formula to 
derive their ratings, empirical researchers explained the ratings as a weighted average of 
key indicators. Warning signals used by the international market are reflected by low 
credit ratings. The statistically significant variables to explain a high rating were: high per 
capita income, more rapid growth, low inflation , low ratio of foreign currency 
debt/exports, absence of a history of defaults and high level of development. The recent 
                                                 
7  Source: International Monetary Fund, WEO, Crisis in Asia, December 1997, table B7.   11
history of budget surplus/GDP and current account surplus/GDP were not statistically 
significant.  
The conclusion drawn by the International Monetary Fund study is that: 
"…spreads as well as market analysts - as represented in Institutional Investor and 
Euromoney ratings - provided signals similar to those of the credit rating agencies. They 
failed to signal the Asian crises in advance
8; they down-graded these countries after their 
crises".(p. 195).  
In summary, with hindsight it is clear that neither the market nor the credit rating 
agencies anticipated the Asian crises.  It is also clear that there is an inadequacy in the 
standard theories to provide warning signals that identify weaknesses early enough to 
guide policy makers in either the prevention of crises or in making a rational response to 
them.  
The object of our paper is to provide a coherent theory, which implies 
quantitatively measurable warning signals of a crisis based upon available information.  
We draw upon two relatively recent theoretical developments to provide an operational 
theory to answer: 
 
(a) Was a currency crisis produced by an overvalued real exchange rate? 
(b) Was a debt crisis produced by an "excessive/unsustainable" external debt? 
(c) What was the interaction between the two? 
 
The phrases in bold letters must be given theoretical and operational content.  We 
use the NATREX model of equilibrium real exchange rates to evaluate whether the 
exchange rate is misaligned – that is whether the actual exchange rate deviates 
significantly from its “equilibrium” value thereby precipitating a currency crisis.  We use 
a Stochastic Optimal Control/Dynamic Programming (SOC/DP) approach to derive the 
optimal foreign debt ratio and we then evaluate the divergence of actual debt from 
                                                 
8  For example, "In Korea, despite the growing awareness of financial sector vulnerabilities following the collapse of 
Hanbo Steel in January 1997, there were no actions by the rating agencies until Moody's placed it on negative outlook 
in June 1997. The downgrade on October 24 by S&P's (from AA- to A+) was accompanied by a sharp rise in yield 
spreads." In Thailand, "S&P made no rating changes in the period between 1994 and July 1997. No further rating 
changes occurred during the severe speculative attacks on the baht in May and the subsequent floating of the bhat in 
July 1997. Interest rate spreads began to rise in the third week of August prior to the downgrade of Thailand's rating by 
S&P's (to A- on September 3)…"(p. 187)   12
optimal to see whether the economy is vulnerable to a debt crisis.  Both NATREX and 
SOC/DP have proved to have explanatory power.  The aim of this paper is to apply these 
techniques and concepts to explain the Asian crises, and thereby provide early warning 
signals of a crisis.  
 
 
3.  Currency and Debt Crises: an overview 
 
3.1  Currency Crisis 
A currency crisis is generated by an overvalued exchange rate.  In order to 
determine whether a rate is overvalued, we need a definition of an “equilibrium” real 
exchange rate.  We use the concept of the natural real exchange rate (NATREX)
9  which 
is the rate that satisfies the four conditions (C1)-(C4) below. 
(C1)  Internal balance prevails where the rate of capacity utilization is equal to its 
long run stationary mean.  
(C2)  External balance exists where there are no speculative capital movements or 
changes in reserves, and domestic and foreign long-term real rates of interest are equal.  
(C3)  The ratio of net foreign liabilities/GDP is constant.  
(C4)  As a result of market forces, the actual exchange rate converges to a 
distribution whose conditional mean is the "equilibrium" rate.  
The NATREX theory can be presented graphically.  In Figure 1, the current 
account CA is negatively related to the real exchange rate R.  An appreciation of the 
currency - rise in R - raises domestic production costs and prices relative to foreign 
production costs and prices.  Competitiveness is reduced and the trade balance declines.  
The saving less investment curve SI is positively related to the real exchange rate, 
because an appreciation of the real exchange rate adversely affects investment.  Insofar as 
goods are sold in the world market, an appreciation of the real exchange rate lowers the 
                                                 
9  The NATREX was originally presented in Stein, Allen et al (1997). Our exposition here is intuitive and the reader is 
referred to the basic articles for the formal derivations and analyses.  The NATREX model has been shown to have 
significant explanatory power for the US dollar, the euro, the D-Mark, the Italian Lira, Australian dollar and some 
Asian currencies. The special issue: "Exchange Rates in Europe and Australasia", Australian Economic Papers, 41 (4) 
December 2002 contains the basic articles referred to above.  The Introduction by Stein and Lim and Stein (2002) and 
Stein (2002) put the articles into perspective   13
Tobin q-ratio, which lowers investment.  Hence an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
increases saving less investment.  The intersection of the CA and SI lines gives the 
determination of the real exchange rate  0 R  when conditions (C1) and (C2) are satisfied.  
We call this the medium run NATREX and it is described algebraically in equation (1) 
 
(1)     0 [| 0 ] RR I S C A =− + =
 
In this case, net savings is negative (the current account deficit is A in Figure 1) 
and hence the foreign debt is rising.  Stability is achieved if the rise in the foreign debt 
stimulates saving, and shifts the SI curve to the right.  For example, the government may 
react to a rising public debt by increasing the primary surplus.
10  As saving rises, in 
response to the accumulation of the debt, the SI curve shifts to the right towards SI*.  
However, the rise in interest payments on the debt shifts the current account curve to the 
left towards CA*.  In the long run equilibrium, the real exchange rate converges to R* in 
Figure 1, where the ratio of debt/GDP is constant. Condition (C3) implies that the 
equilibrium trade balance to GDP ratio (denoted B*) divided by the equilibrium 
debt/GDP ratio (h*) is equal to (r- g*) the real interest rate (return on financial assets) 
less the equilibrium growth rate g*.  This term must be positive if present values of assets 
are finite.  The long run NATREX satisfies conditions (C1)-(C4) and is described by 
equations (1) and (2). 
 
(2)  
** (; )( )
* B RZ r gh =−  
 
where 
* R  is the long run NATREX,   is the equilibrium debt to GDP ratio.  The 
elements of vector Z are the fundamental determinants underlying the S-I and CA 
functions.  They are productivity (υ) and time preference (ρ) measured as the ratio of 
social consumption/GDP.  In Figure 1, the current account/GDP is denoted as E<0 and 
the debt to GDP has stabilized at h*. 
* h
 
                                                 
10  This occurs more strongly in the industrial countries than in the emerging market countries; see [IMF, WEO9-2003, 
p128] for observed relations between these two variables.   14
 
Figure 1.  The Medium run and long run real exchange rate NATREX 
 
In the short run, the uncovered “interest rate” parity theory states that the real 
exchange rate  t R  will exceed (be less than) its longer run equilibrium value 
* R  if the 
domestic real rate of return on assets   exceeds (is less than) the corresponding foreign 
rate  .
11  This is denoted as 
t i
*
t i t R  in Figure 1 and mathematically in equation (3). 
Coefficient α is a speed of response. 
 
(3)  
** log( ) log( ) ( ) tt t R Ri α =+ − i  
 
If there is a speculative bubble in asset prices, then the domestic anticipated return 
 rises relative to the foreign rate i .  There is a speculative capital inflow, which 




t R  above  0 R  the medium run equilibrium value.  We 
can think of this inflow as the bank loans and investments in Table 3 during the period 
                                                 
11  This rate of return could be on fixed income instruments, equity or real property.     15
1993-96.  The net effect is that the current account deficit rises to B>A, and the external 
debt rises at a faster rate. 
Real exchange rate  t R  is not sustainable for several reasons.  First, it can only 
persist as long as there is a speculative capital inflow.  The latter is generated by the 
differential in rate of return on assets.  Insofar as the higher rate of return is generated 
solely by anticipated capital gains - where asset prices are rising without a corresponding 
rise in earnings generated - debt service payments are increasing relative to earnings.  The 
bubble must burst, sooner or later.  Second, as long as there is a current account deficit, 
(for example point B in Figure 1) due to speculative capital inflow, the debt/GDP and 
interest payments/GDP will rise.  The rise in the debt service reduces the current account, 
and shifts the CA curve to the left along the initial saving less investment curve SI(0).  
The decline in the current account relative to saving less investment depreciates the real 
exchange rate. 
A measure of misalignment (
*
tt t R R Φ =−) is the deviation of actual real exchange 
( t R ) from the equilibrium value (
*
t R ).  A large value of  t Φ  is clearly a warning signal of 
an impending currency crisis.  Furthermore, since the equilibrium value (
*
t R ) is related to 
the set of fundamental variables  t Z , we can also explain the cause of the misalignment.  
In section 4, we examine how well this measure identified periods of overvaluation, and 




3.2  Debt Crisis 
A currency crisis is likely to result when the actual real exchange rate exceeds the 
benchmark exchange rate- the NATREX – for a considerable period of time.  Similarly, a 
debt crisis is likely to occur when actual external debt is excessive or “unsustainable”.  In 
order to assess whether the debt is “unsustainable” we need a concept of an optimal debt 
as our benchmark.  Excess debt can then be measured as the deviation of the actual debt   16
from the optimal debt.  Our concept of an optimal debt draws upon our recent work on 
stochastic optimal control/dynamic programming analysis of optimal debt
12. 
The country will have a debt crisis if the attempt to service the debt requires a 
decline in consumption below a tolerable level, or requires a drastic decline in 
consumption.  To see this first consider equation (4) which describes the change in the 
debt  , where L is the real external debt.   t dL
 
(4)     ( ) ( ) tt t t t t t t dL I S dt C I rL Y dt =− = + + −
 
It arises because consumption C  plus investment  t t I  plus the debt service   exceeds Y  
the GDP.  Alternatively, the change in the debt is (
tt rL t
) tt I Sd t −  investment less saving over 
the period.  In the Latin American countries the debt has risen due to high consumption 
and/or low social saving by the public plus the private sectors.  In the Asian countries, the 
high investment has produced the external debt.  For example, there were speculative 
bubbles in asset prices for land and/or equity that raise the anticipated returns.  The 
differential investment less saving leads to a capital inflow and an increase in the external 
debt. 
The external debt has to be serviced and that would clearly affect consumption.  
We can see this by writing consumption at some time after t, say at time s=t+∆t, equation 
(5) below.  
 




Consumption is equal to the GNP, which is equal to the GDP less the debt service 
( s ss Yr L −  , less investment  t I  plus new borrowing  .  t dL
 
Focus now on the behavior of the two stochastic variables - real GDP and real 
interest rate.  If bad shocks reduce the GDP and raise real interest rates, and investment 
                                                 
12  The analysis is based upon Fleming-Stein (2004), Stein (2004) and Fleming (2004). The reader is referred to these 
papers for the technical details and proofs.  This analysis was used by Stein (2004) to explain the US farm debt crisis of 
the 1980s.   17
falls to a minimum level Is = Imin then consumption may have to be reduced - unless there 
is new borrowing to offset the decline
13.  In the event that new borrowing is not 
forthcoming, we may expect a debt crisis because it is more likely that the country would 
renegotiate its debt than reduce consumption.  
To formalize the discussion we model the two sources of uncertainty which affect 
consumption.  The first source of uncertainty is the growth of GDP described in equation 
(6) below.   
 
(6)  dYt /Yt = b It /Yt dt + σy dwy 
 
Real growth   has two components: a deterministic component bI  where b is 
the mean return on investment times It/Yt the ratio of investment/GDP, and a stochastic 
component involving the variance of output  .  This stochastic part may be viewed as 
arising from variations in the terms of trade, the conditions of aggregate demand and the 
composition and quality of the investments. 
/ t dY Yt t / t Y
2
ydt σ
The second source of uncertainty concerns the real interest rate required to service 
the external debt  .  The real interest rate in terms of consumer goods   has three 
components.  The first is the real interest rate on US Treasury long term debt. The second 
is the premium on dollar denominated debt charged to sovereign borrowers. The third is 
the anticipated exchange rate depreciation of the currency.  Equation (7) is the equation 
for the real debt service, where the first term is deterministic and the second term is 
stochastic. Each component varies and produces a variance of 
t L t r
) (
2
rt L dt σ  on the real debt 
service.   
 
(7)   tt t tt r rLdt rLdt Ldw σ =+  
 
Each source of uncertainty is modeled as a Brownian Motion.  Each expectation of dwy 
and dwr is equal to zero, but they are correlated.  During the Asian crisis period, the 
                                                 
13  In Korea, the investment/GDP ratio fell from 35% in 1997 to 21% in 1998. In Thailand the investment ratio fell 
from 41% in 1996 to 22% in 1998.   18
growth of GDP and real interest rate were negatively correlated and that can be explained 
briefly as follows.   
A decline in GDP may occur because of a decline in the terms of trade and/or the 
anticipated return on investment turns out to be an illusion and the asset bubble collapses, 
dwy < 0.  Since firms borrow primarily from the banks to finance real investment and the 
banks in turn primarily finance their loans by borrowing US dollars in the international 
capital market, a domino effect is created in the event of a financial panic.  When debtors 
are unable to repay their loans to the banks, the banks in turn become unable to repay 
their loans to international creditors.  Financial panic leads to a short term capital flight.  
The government may try to help out by using the dollar reserves, but that is only a 
stopgap measure.  Sooner or later the monetary authorities will raise interest rates and, 
when that fails to stem the outflow, the currency will suffer a devaluation/depreciation.  
The depreciation of the currency implies that the real rate of interest, measured in terms 
of the prices of goods produced, rises (dwr > 0).  The situation is exacerbated when banks 
denominate their loans to the domestic firms in US dollars. Firms would find it very 
difficult to service debts denominated in foreign currency because they are faced with 
both a rising rate of interest and a depreciating currency.  
Faced with these sources of uncertainty, how then should a country select its 
optimal debt and level of consumption to maximize the expectation of the discounted 
value of the utility of consumption over an infinite or finite horizon?  The intertemporal 
nature of the process is seen in equations (4) and (5).  A rise in the debt at one time will 
affect consumption at a later date.  The standard approach in the economics literature is to 
maximize the expectation of the discounted value of the utility of consumption subject to 
an "Intertemporal Budget Constraint" IBC.  The IBC requires that the expectation of the 
discounted value of consumption be equal to the expectation of the discounted value of 
GDP.  
Given the uncertainty concerning the growth rate (equation 6) and real interest 
rate (equation 7), the future is unpredictable.  The IBC is unknowable and unenforceable.  
How can anyone know if any country is, or is not, violating the constraint?  The IBC is a 
non-operational concept.  This profound deficiency of the IBC approach led Fleming and   19
Stein to use dynamic programming DP approach
14.  The controls are the debt and 
consumption.  The optimal controls are functions of the state of the system, which are 
observable/measurable variables.  
As shown in Fleming-Stein (2004) and Stein (2004), the solution for the optimal 
ratio of debt/net worth is equation (8).  Only an intuitive explanation is presented here.  
Using Stochastic Optimal Control/Dynamic Programming we derive the optimal ratio f* 
of debt/net worth




* () / ( 1 ) ( 0
2 ) f br f γσ =− − + ,  σ
2 = var (dYt/Yt - rt), 
 
where b is the mean return to investment (in equation 6), r is mean real interest rate (in 
equation 7), quantity (1 - γ ) is a measure of risk aversion and  σ
2 is the variance of the 
quantity (dYt/Yt - rt), the current growth rate less the current interest rate, so that it also 
contains a covariance term.  Equation (8) is graphed in Figure 2 as line US. 
The optimum ratio of debt/net worth, f* is positively related to the mean rate of 
return on investment less the mean real rate of interest (b-r).  The slope is the reciprocal 
of the product of risk aversion and risk.  The intercept f(0) is the optimal ratio of debt/net 
worth, when the expected net return (b-r) = 0.  When the correlation coefficient between 
the growth rate and interest rate is less than  / yr σ σ , the intercept f(0)<0.  Any 
nonpositive correlation implies f(0) < 0 as drawn in Figure 2.  The country should be a 
debtor only when the net return (b-r)>A>0, where A is the risk premium implied by 
equation (8).  
                                                 
14  The DP approach is used in mathematical finance, starting from the work of Robert Merton. 
15  Net worth is "capital" less debt. Capital is the Frank Knight concept, the discounted value of current income, Yt/b, 
where Yt is current GDP and b is the mean return on investment in equation (6). This is a measurable and logical 
concept. The ratio of ht = debt/GDP is positively related to the ratio of ft = debt/net worth.  Therefore, we can speak 
about either ratio f or h interchangeably.  The optimum ratio of consumption/net worth is constant, c* = Ct/Xt.  
Therefore consumption, net worth and GDP grow at the same rate.   20
 
Figure 2.  Optimal Ratio Debt/Net Worth f* 
curve US , when there are no liquidation costs and curve U'S' with liquidation costs 
 
Curve US is the optimal ratio, if there were no transactions or liquidation costs in 
selling capital to repay debt.  When there are transactions/liquidation costs of selling 
capital to repay debt, there is another line U'S' above US.  The optimal control is as 
follows:  (i) if the debt/net worth is above U'S', lower it immediately to this line;  (ii) if 
the debt/net worth is below US, raise it immediately to this line;  (iii) if the debt/net worth 
is between the two lines, do nothing.   Most of the time, the optimal debt ratio will lie in 
the region between the curves. The proof of these statements is difficult
16, but the 
intuition can be conveyed. As the net worth changes drastically and very frequently due 
to the Brownian motion, given the same mean net return (b-r), the capital should be 
bought and sold to keep the debt ratio constant given by line US. The sales of the capital 
to repay the debt would have to occur at "fire sale" prices. Then, as net worth rises again 
due to the Brownian motion, the capital would have to be repurchased with new debt. All 
                                                 
16  The references to the proofs in the mathematical literature, especially by Davis and Norman, Fleming and Soner, is 
in Stein (2004).   21
of these sell-buy transactions involve significant costs. Such a process would quickly 
dissipate the net worth. The optimum control is not to vary the capital or debt unless the 
ratio is sufficiently far from the optimal to justify the huge liquidation costs. In the graph, 
we assumed that there were only "liquidation costs" and not costs of acquisition. 
Therefore, only if the debt ratio is above U'S' should the ratio be reduced. Even then, it 
should only be reduced to U'S' and not to US. The difference between these curves is a 
complicated function of the liquidation costs.  
The optimum debt ratio, our benchmark of performance, has several important 
characteristics.  It is the value where: (i) The expected present value of the utility of 
consumption is maximized, (ii) the expected growth rate - of consumption, net worth and 
GDP - is maximized
17. The major implications of the analysis are as follows.  
 
•  As the debt ratio rises above the optimum f*, the expected growth rate declines, and 
the risk - the variance of the growth rate increases. 
•  Since optimal consumption is proportional to net worth, as the debt ratio rises above 
the optimum, the expected growth of consumption declines and its variance rises.  
The probability of a decline in consumption increases and the probability of a debt 
crisis increases. 
•  Insofar as there are liquidation costs in selling capital to repay debt, the optimal ratio 
should lie between lines US and U'S' in Figure 2, where the difference is a function of 
liquidation costs.  
 
In summary, when the net return (b-r) is falling and the debt/GDP ratio is rising, it 
is more probable that the debt ratio is in the region above the curve U'S'.  Hence 
divergent movements of the net return (b-r) and the debt/GDP ratio can serve as an 
operational warning signal that foreign debt is becoming “excessive”
18 and that the 
                                                 
17  This is true in the case of the logarithmic utility function. 
18  The stochastic optimal control approach to deriving a benchmark for the optimal debt is conditional upon the model 
and the stochastic processes. In the model above, we assumed that the debt was long term at a variable interest rate. 
Thus there were two shocks, which were correlated. On the other hand in Stein-Paladino (2001), based upon Fleming-
Stein (2001), the model assumed that debt was short term foreign currency debt that must be repaid at the end of the 
period, such as the category "Bank loans, investments" in table 3 above. The stochastic variable was the return on 
investment, variable bt. The "bad" state of nature is a value of the return below the interest rate. We calculated both an 
optimal debt/GDP ratio and a maximal ratio of debt/GDP called debt-max. If the debt exceeded the debt-max then - if 
the "bad" state of nature occurs - consumption would have to be reduced below a tolerable level and the country would   22
economy is becoming susceptible to default.  In section 4, we examine the time-paths of 
actual debt/GDP ratios relative to the time-paths of their (b-r) values to explain the 
pattern of debt defaults during the period of the Asian financial crisis.  
 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
Section 4.1 discusses whether the Asian currencies were overvalued, and section 4.2 
discusses whether they had excessive debt. Table 6 below summarizes the results. In the 
conclusion part 5, we explain the interaction of these two sources of crisis. The reader 
may want to look at this table while reading these two parts. 
 
4.1   Were the Asian Currencies overvalued? 
In this section, we examine the proposition that the nominal exchange rate 
depreciated in 1997, because the real exchange rate ( t R ) was overvalued relative to the 
equilibrium rate suggested by NATREX.  The real exchange rate  t R  is defined as 
* (/ ) tt t t R NPP =  where the nominal rate N is defined as the number of $US per domestic 
currency (a rise is an appreciation), and P (P*) is the domestic (foreign) price index.  The 
currencies of Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia were linked to the US dollar, 
which appreciated from 1995-98 relative to both the Japanese Yen and to a trade 
weighted index.  Misalignment would occur if the actual real exchange rate deviated 
significantly from the NATREX suggested rate. 
Following the discussion above, we estimate the deviation of the actual rate from 
the NATREX equilibrium rate as our measure of the degree of over and under valuation, 
i.e., “misalignment”.  To compute our empirical measure of misalignment, first recognize 
that misalignment
*
tt t R R − Φ=  can be rewritten as 
*
1 () ( tt t t t 1 ) R RR R − − − − − Φ= . The first 
term is the actual change in the exchange rate.  The second term can be written as: 
                                                                                                                                                   
default. In the empirical work, the debt was the total sovereign debt to both sovereign and private creditors, 
denominated in US dollars. We used as our Warning Signal the difference DEF = [(debt/GDP) - (debt-max)]. Stein-
Paladino showed that the actual debt ratio was not able to explain default. On the other hand, a sufficient condition for 
rescheduling/default was that DEF > 0, the debt ratio exceed (debt-max). A second Warning Signal of an excessive 
debt is that DEF > 0 and/or rising significantly.   23
** * *
11 1 () () ( tt tt t t 1 ) R RR RR R −− − −= −+− − t .  Term 
**
1 () tt R R α − Z − =∆ is the change in the 
NATREX based upon changes in the fundamentals in vector Z, and term ()
*
11 tt RR t ε −− −= .  
Thus term 
*
1 () tt t t RR Z α ε − −= ∆ + .  Then use recursive least squares to estimate the 
coefficient α in the regression equation  tt t t RZ α ε ∆ =∆+.  Finally compute misalignment 
*
tt t R R Φ= −
1 ˆ tt t t
 as: 
R Z α − Φ= ∆ − ∆
1 ˆt α −
t Φ
t Z ∆ Φ
 
(9)    
 
Vector Z contains three fundamental variables:
19 productivity (υ), time-preference
20 (ρ) 
measured as the ratio consumption/GDP - which is negative thrift, and the differential of 
long-term real net return (b-r).  The b is the domestic real return and r reflects the cost of 
capital.   Our method of estimation avoids the problems associated with non-stationary 
time-series data and more importantly, the coefficients contained in the vector   are 
estimated by recursive least squares and hence are based only on information up to time t.  
Post-crisis information is not used before the event to predict the event.  As presented 
above,   may be interpreted as the deviation of the actual change in the real exchange 
rates from the change that should prevail at time t, given changes in the explanatory 
variables,   suggested by NATREX.
21  Note however that  t  is an estimate of the 
difference between the level of actual Rt and the NATREX estimated Rt*. 
Productivity (υ) is measured as real GDP per capita and time preference (ρ) is the 
ratio of household and government consumption expenditure per GDP.  The real return to 
investment expenditure (b) is computed as the (growth rate of GDP)/(investment/GDP).  
The long term real return r is the 10-year US bond rate less US inflation
22.  These 
variables are all readily available from the IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
                                                 
19  We also tested a terms of trade variable, but they were not always significant. 
20  From SOC/DP analysis the optimal ratio of consumption/net worth is the discount rate, when a logarithmic utility 
function is used; See Fleming and Stein (2004). 
21  Note that, this approach avoids a problem associated with estimation over the whole sample period and then defining 
the residuals of a regression model as a measure of misalignment.  Here post-crisis information is not used before the 
event to predict the event. 
22  The real interest rate should take into account the anticipated depreciation of the currency.  Since the exchange rates 
were linked to the $US, the market did not take the likelihood of depreciation into account.   24
Charts 1-5 present our analysis for the ASEAN 4 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand) plus Korea.  The pre-crisis period 1994-96 is shaded. 
Each chart shows a plot of the deviations of the level of the actual rate from the 
NATREX rate (expressed in standardised units, that is in the form: 
) as well as information about the explanatory variables   [] () / ( tt mean std Φ− Φ Φ) t υ ∆ , 
ρ ∆  and (b-r) pre, during and post crisis.  Recall that the NATREX is a positive concept - 
the real exchange rate satisfying conditions (C1)-(C4) above - and not a normative 
concept such as Williamson's FEER. 
The crisis started in Thailand, whose currency was linked to the $US which was 
appreciating relative to the Yen and other major currencies.  As shown in the charts, 
Thailand is the country with the prolonged pre-crisis period of misalignment from about 
1990 to 1995/96.  The decline in productivity, increase in the propensity to consume, plus 
decline in relative return – all signaled that a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
(given sticky prices) was necessary to realign the real exchange rate.  Deviation Φt  is a 
warning signal of misalignment.
23 
The signals for Korea were the same as for Thailand, but in this case the exchange 
rate was not seriously misaligned.  A crucial variable that is common to both the 
Misalignment and excess debt is the net rate of return on investment.  In both Thailand 
and Korea, the net return (b-r) declined drastically from 1995 to 1997.  This means that 
the medium run equilibrium exchange rate should be falling from Rt  towards R* in figure 
1.  Thereby we have warning signals of exchange rate misalignment for Thailand and 
Korea. 
In contrast, over the period 1981-96 the Indonesia rupiah was aligned with the 
NATREX rate and there were no signals, based upon trends of productivity, time-
preference or returns, that the currency was misaligned.  Malaysia and the Philippines, 
show no prolonged periods of misalignment.  In fact the pre-crisis signals, such as a 
decrease in the propensity to consume, supported the appreciation then underway. 
 
                                                 
23  Rajan, Sen and Siregar (2002) conducted an ex-post study of the Baht's misalignment with respect to the Japanese 
Yen since Thailand's main trading partner was Japan, which was also the major creditor.  They concluded that it was 
relatively larger than that for the $US and that the misalignment with respect to the Yen is consistent with a widening 
of the Thai trade deficits before the crisis.   25
4.2  Were the Asian foreign debts unsustainable? 
 
Following the discussion in section 3.2, our strategy is to compare the evolution 
of the actual debt/GDP ratios h with the evolution of the relative returns (b-r) on 
investment in the Asian countries.  If the relative return is declining significantly but the 
debt ratio is rising significantly or not declining, then the debt ratio is moving into the 
region above the line U'S' and the probability of default increases for the following 
reason.  Growth is expected to decline and the variance/risk to rise.  For any consumption 
ratio, a decline in expected growth and a rise in its variance will augur a decline in 
consumption and hence a debt crisis.  A sufficient condition for a crisis is a strong decline 
in the relative net return and a rise or at least not a decline in the debt ratio.  
We know, with hindsight that the Asian countries that defaulted were Indonesia 
(1998), Korea (1998) and the Philippines (1984-96) and the countries that did not default 
were Malaysia and Thailand.  We now explore whether our suggested warning signal 
variables h and (b-r) for Korea would have indicated the likelihood of default whereas 
the signals for Malaysia would have indicated no financial vulnerability.  
For each country, h  is the actual debt/GDP ratio based on data published by the 
Economic Intelligence Unit.  The debt is total external debt stock “comprising public and 
publicly guaranteed long term debt, private non-guaranteed debt, use of IMF credit and 
short term debt, end of period”.  The net return (b-r) is as defined above.  Again, these are 
publicly available data and subjected to no manipulations.  The plots of   and   
are shown in Charts 1-5.  The pre-crisis period 1994-96 is shaded.  
t
t h ( )t br −
The return bt varied significantly, but the interest rate spread and credit ratings 
were practically constant until the crises, as noted above.  Therefore, any anticipated 
exchange rate depreciation was not reflected in the cost of capital.  Variations in (bt - rt) 
are almost exclusively due to variations in the return on investment bt. We do not 
arbitrarily select a comparison period, rather we use the information contained in the two 
time series.  When they diverge in the manner described above, we anticipate a crisis.  
The data are annual, which irons out random fluctuations. 
Korea and Thailand both gave warning signals that they were incurring excess 
debt.  In both cases, prior to the crisis, there was a clear upswing in the debt/gdp ratio and   26
a clear downswing in relative returns.  Industrial policy in Korea involving the 
government, the banks and the "chaebols" aimed for rapid growth with little concern for 
the rate of return b on investment.  The banks were used as the means to finance the 
growth.  The banks were not concerned about the risk, because there was an implicit 
government guarantee.  That is why the total external debt ratio rose, even though the net 
returns were declining.  In Thailand, the net return declined from 12% pa in 1994 to 
4.77% pa in 1996 (see chart 5), but the external debt rose by 40% during that period.  
Rajan, Sen and Siregar show that half of the debt was short-term, 45%, was denominated 
in Yen and Japanese banks were the major creditors. 
Warning signals for Korea and Thailand mean that the expected growth of 
consumption was low and its variance was high.  Any random event could lead to a debt 
crisis, where the economy could not service its debt without reducing consumption.  Such 
random events were the bankruptcies of major Korean concerns in 1997 before the crisis, 
and the collapse of the bubble in the construction sector in Thailand that led to bank 
failures
24.  
Whereas Korea and Thailand both showed Warning Signals of an excess debt, in 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines there was no evidence that the debt ratio was 
“excessive” in the pre-crisis period 1994-96.  However for the Philippines, there were 
clear Warning Signals of the debt crises period 1984-94.  
 
 
5.  Conclusions: Interactions of types of crisis 
 
Much has been written, with hindsight, about the causes of the Asian financial 
crisis.  The crises were unexpected by the market and many countries in the region 
experienced it at about the same time.  The traditional warning signals in use then
25 were 
inadequate.  To this end, we analyzed the Asian financial crisis from two related 
perspectives - whether the crisis was precipitated by a failure of the real exchange rate to 
                                                 
24 See Flouzat, chapter 2 and Rajan, Sen and Siregar for stimulating discussions of the developments in the Asian 
countries. 
25  These signals were the budget deficit, inflation and current account deficit. Table 2 shows that they were 
inadequate.   27
be aligned with its fundamental determinants, and/or whether the crisis was precipitated 
by a divergence of the foreign debt from its optimal path.  Our models produced a set of 
objective, theoretically based warning signals and our empirical analysis allowed us to 
assess whether there were signs of financial distress before the crisis. 
Table 6 presents a summary of the warning signals, based upon Charts 1-5.  Our 
warning signals and measures of misalignment are based upon available information 
before the crisis.  In all of these countries during the crisis, the exchange rate depreciated 
and the GDP declined significantly, as shown in Table 1.  
The two types of crises are inter-related.  In both cases, the level of either the real 
exchange rate or the debt is irrelevant.  The relevant variables are: (a) the Misalignment 
Φ(t) of the real exchange rate from the NATREX in figure 1, and (b) the deviation of the 
debt ratio from its optimal level - if the debt ratio has risen above curve U'S' in figure 2. 
A currency crisis may lead to a debt crisis in the following way.  In figure 1, the 
exchange rate  t R  is overvalued relative to the longer run NATREX R*, because a 
speculative/unsustainable bubble led to a differential anticipated rate of return on assets.  
Capital inflows raise the debt.  Initially the inflow is 0B per unit of time.  When the 
anticipated return turns out to be an illusion, such as in Korea and Thailand, the capital 
inflows will not continue at the same level and the real exchange rate will fall drastically 
to a lower NATREX.  If the nominal exchange rate is free, there will be exchange rate 
depreciation and the real interest rate - measured in terms of the GDP deflator - on the 
foreign debt will rise.  If the nominal exchange rate is pegged, reserves will decline.  The 
monetary authorities may raise interest rates.  Eventually, the currency will be 
depreciated.  In either case, real interest rates rise.  If the debt is sufficiently high, then 
term rsLs in equation (5) will rise drastically and tend to reduce consumption Cs in 
equation (5).  Moreover when the exchange rate depreciates, there may also be a capital 
outflow - term dLt falls.  
Once the exchange rate collapses, it is easy to understand why defaults may occur.  
The collapse of the exchange rate raises the cost of servicing the foreign debt, which 
leads to bankruptcies and financial market stringency.  As a result, the country is thrown 
into a recession when the GDP falls.  Even though the level of the debt has been 
relatively stable, the decline in the GDP raises the debt/GDP ratio.  The attempt to service   28
the debt would reduce consumption below a tolerable level and the country will default. 
In this way, a currency crisis may lead to a debt crisis.  If the value of rsLs is not too high, 
then misalignment Φ(t) will only generate a currency crisis. 
A debt crisis occurs with positive probability when the debt ratio has risen above 
the U'S' curve.  A rise in the debt ratio occurs if there have been sustained capital inflows, 
current account deficits.  If the debt ratio rises along curve US because of rises in (b-r), 
the rise in the debt ratio is optimal.  Therefore current account deficits or rises in the debt 
per se do not imply that there will be a crisis.  Table 5 shows that the debt service/exports 
did not rise in the Asian countries before the crisis.  However, there cannot be a debt 
crisis without a prior rise in the debt.  It is not revealing to state that current account 
deficits lead to a debt crisis. 
However, if the debt ratio tends to rise above curve U'S' in figure 2, then the 
situation is unstable.  Any random event - decline in Yt or a rise in rt - can generate a debt 
crisis.  Once the country is unable to service the debt, then there will be a capital outflow, 
particularly short term capital.  See net private capital flows: bank loans and investments 
from 1995-98 in table 3.  As a result of these outflows, the exchange rate collapses.  In 
this way a debt crisis leads to a currency crisis.  
Our analysis focuses upon two countries: Thailand and Korea.  Table 6 suggests 
that Thailand was primed for a collapse of the currency.  Its exchange rate was severely 
misaligned and its foreign debt was sub-optimal.  The warning signs for Korea were the 
same as for Thailand – consumption was increasing at a time of falling productivity and 
relative returns.  The Korean exchange rate was not severely misaligned, but there were 
clear Warning Signals and the financial crisis took the form of a debt crisis.  
Our analysis did not find objective warning signals of the 1997-98 crises for 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines.  There were no declines in productivity or in the 
differential returns prior to the crisis.  The situation for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines may be symptomatic of a "contagious effect".  When the crises occurred in 
Thailand and Korea, because the situations were not sustainable in terms of our objective 
criteria, the Japanese commercial banks - which were the common lender - raised risk 
premia for loans to the other countries in the region.  The Japanese banks tried to reduce   29
their risk exposure to the other borrowers.  Short term capital flowed out of the other 
Asian countries and their exchange rates depreciated.  
The "contagion" argument is a description rather than a precise analytical 
concept
26.  Rajan and Siregar (2002) compared the experiences of Hong Kong with those 
of Singapore.  They are similar economies, subject to similar shocks.  The main 
difference between them is the flexibility of the exchange rate to real shocks - our 
fundamentals discussed in part 4.  The Hong Kong currency was linked to the $US via a 
currency board.  The Singapore currency was much more flexible.  Rajan and Siregar 
estimated the NATREX for each economy and then examined ex-post, the degree of 
misalignment.  They found that, in the period leading up to the crisis, the Hong Kong 
currency was misaligned, whereas the Singapore dollar was not.  When the Asian crises 
occurred, the Hong Kong growth rate fell severely from 5.15% pa in 1997 to -5 % p.a. in 
1998.  In Singapore the growth rate declined from 8.8% to 0.5%, a significantly better 
performance than in Hong Kong.  A message here seems to be that “contagion” can be 
mitigated by avoiding exchange rate misalignment and by adopting a more flexible 
exchange rate system.  
 
                                                 
26 There is a large literature on "contagion"; see Kaminsky et al.   30
 
Table 6:  Summary of Warning Signals Analysis for 1997-98 Crises 
Country  Actual Changes   Analysis of 
Misalignments pre-
crisis 




Indonesia Rupiah  depreciated 
and debt  
defaulted 1998 
No evidence of 
significant 
misalignment 
No warning signals 
 
Korea           Won  
depreciated debt 
defaulted 1998 




Evidence of growing 
debt/GDP ratio 
despite falling excess 
returns 
Malaysia Ringgit 
depreciated but there 















No Warning Signals 




depreciated but there 
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82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00
misalignment (standardised units)
 
Warning Signal Variables:  Pre, During and Post Crisis (Indonesia) 
  ∆υ  (%)   ∆ρ (%)  (b-r) % 
      
1994 5.72  0.39  13.68 
1995 6.39  2.35  14.96 
1996 6.06  0.74  14.21 
1997 3.16  -2.04  5.67 
1998 -15.47  6.99  -104.57 
1999 -0.58  9.19  -18.06 
2000 3.44  -7.42  15.69 
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misalignment (standardised units)
 
Warning Signal Variables:  Pre, During and Post Crisis (Korea) 
  ∆υ  (%)  ∆ρ (%)  (b-r) % 
      
1994 6.94  0.93  11.50 
1995 7.61  -0.34  15.13 
1996 5.65  2.50  9.34 
1997 4.06  0.52  5.58 
1998 -7.70  -1.06  -34.24 
1999 9.60  1.39  32.91 
2000 8.22  1.22  26.47 
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82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00
misalignment (standardised units)
 
Warning Signal Variables:  Pre, During and Post Crisis (Malaysia) 
  ∆υ  (%)  ∆ρ (%)  (b-r) % 
    
1994 6.17  -0.84  13.73 
1995 6.77  -0.18  14.30 
1996 6.96  -5.38  15.45 
1997 4.53  -1.81  9.72 
1998 -10.11  -8.91  -37.35 
1999 3.59  2.38  21.03 
2000 5.76  0.52  27.02 
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82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00
misalignment (standardised units)
 
Warning Signal Variables:  Pre, During and Post Crisis (Philippines) 
  ∆υ  (%)  ∆ρ (%)  (b-r) % 
     
1994 2.07  -1.27  5.63 
1995  2.39 0.37 9.08 
1996 3.55  -0.07  12.06 
1997 2.97  0.45  10.97 
1998 -2.61  2.08  -15.73 
1999 1.36  -2.20  7.53 
2000 1.99  -3.55  11.58 
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Warning Signal Variables:  Pre, During and Post Crisis (Thailand) 
  ∆υ  (%)  ∆ρ (%)  (b-r) % 
     
1994 7.42  -1.44  12.11 
1995 7.69  -1.05  12.06 
1996  4.64 1.41 4.77 
1997 -0.02  1.20  -13.59 
1998 -0.12  0.73  -61.10 
1999 0.03  3.39  17.03 
2000 0.03  -0.19  16.39 
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